The political economy of bad data: Evidence from African survey and administrative statistics

Resource type
Journal Article
Authors/contributors
Title
The political economy of bad data: Evidence from African survey and administrative statistics
Abstract
Across multiple African countries, discrepancies between administrative data and independent household surveys suggest official statistics systematically exaggerate development progress. We provide evidence for two distinct explanations of these discrepancies. First, governments misreport to foreign donors, as in the case of a results-based aid programme rewarding reported vaccination rates. Second, national governments are themselves misled by frontline service providers, as in the case of primary education, where official enrolment numbers diverged from survey estimates after funding shifted from user fees to per pupil government grants. Both syndromes highlight the need for incentive compatibility between data systems and funding rules.
Publication
The Journal of Development Studies
Volume
51
Issue
2
Pages
116-132
Date
2015-02-01
ISSN
0022-0388
Short Title
The Political Economy of Bad Data
Accessed
07/04/2022, 17:38
Library Catalogue
Taylor and Francis+NEJM
Extra
Publisher: Routledge _eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2014.968138
Citation
Sandefur, J., & Glassman, A. (2015). The political economy of bad data: Evidence from African survey and administrative statistics. The Journal of Development Studies, 51(2), 116–132. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2014.968138