Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya

Resource type
Journal Article
Authors/contributors
Title
Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya
Abstract
To the extent that students benefit from high-achieving peers, tracking will help strong students and hurt weak ones. However, all students may benefit if tracking allows teachers to better tailor their instruction level. Lower-achieving pupils are particularly likely to benefit from tracking when teachers have incentives to teach to the top of the distribution. We propose a simple model nesting these effects and test its implications in a randomized tracking experiment conducted with 121 primary schools in Kenya. While the direct effect of high-achieving peers is positive, tracking benefited lower-achieving pupils indirectly by allowing teachers to teach to their level. (JEL I21, J45, O15)
Publication
American Economic Review
Volume
101
Issue
5
Pages
1739-1774
Date
2011/08
Language
en
ISSN
0002-8282
Short Title
Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking
Accessed
23/07/2020, 16:35
Library Catalogue
Citation
Duflo, E., Dupas, P., & Kremer, M. (2011). Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya. American Economic Review, 101(5), 1739–1774. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.5.1739