Your search
In authors or contributors
Upping the Ante: The Equilibrium Effects of Unconditional Grants to Private Schools
Resource type
Report
Authors/contributors
- Andrabi, Tahir (Author)
- Das, Jishnu (Author)
- Khwaja, Asim I. (Author)
- Ozyurt, Selcuk (Author)
- Singh, Niharika (Author)
Title
Upping the Ante: The Equilibrium Effects of Unconditional Grants to Private Schools
Abstract
This paper tests for financial constraints as a market failure in education in a low-income country. In an experimental setup, unconditional cash grants are allocated to one private school or all private schools in a village. Enrollment increases in both treatments, accompanied by infrastructure investments. However, test scores and fees only increase in the setting of all private schools along with higher teacher wages. This differential impact follows from a canonical oligopoly model with capacity constraints and endogenous quality: greater financial saturation crowds-in quality investments. The findings of higher social surplus in the setting of all private schools, but greater private returns in the setting of one private school underscore the importance of leveraging market structure in designing educational subsidies.
Report Type
Working Paper
Place
Washington, DC
Institution
World Bank
Date
2018-08
Language
English
Short Title
Upping the Ante
Accessed
07/04/2022, 17:34
Library Catalogue
Extra
Accepted: 2018-08-23T17:19:28Z
DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-8563
Citation
Andrabi, T., Das, J., Khwaja, A. I., Ozyurt, S., & Singh, N. (2018). Upping the Ante: The Equilibrium Effects of Unconditional Grants to Private Schools [Working Paper]. World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-8563
Link to this record